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Numbers, Motivated Reasoning, and 
Empirical Legal Scholarship 
CAROLYN SHAPIRO† 
In Do Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group 
Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment, the authors 
explain that they are concerned that justices might be more 
likely to protect the speech of litigants with whom they 
sympathize ideologically or whom they view as being on the 
same team.1 Starting from the premise that liberal justices 
are inherently more likely to support First Amendment 
claims and conservative justices are more likely to reject 
them, they find systematic departures from this baseline 
depending on the speakers or the content of the speech.2 In 
his comprehensive critique of Do Justices Defend the Speech 
They Hate?, Todd Pettys provides numerous reasons why the 
authors’ conclusions must be taken with a grain of salt.3 In 
this Response, I suggest that part of the problem for the 
authors (as it is for much empirical legal scholarship more 
  
† Carolyn Shapiro is an Associate Professor of Law at IIT Chicago-Kent College 
of Law. She is currently on leave from that position and is serving as the Illinois 
Solicitor General. The opinions expressed in this essay are hers alone and do not 
reflect the views or positions of the Illinois Attorney General’s Office. 
 1. See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jerffrey A. Segal, Do Justices 
Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First 
Amendment, 2-3 available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Epstein et al., In-Group Bias]. 
 2. See generally id. 
 3. See generally Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and The 
Court’s Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1 (2015). 
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generally) stems from an inaccurate placement of ideology in 
opposition to an ideal of legal neutrality and a static notion 
of the ideological valence of various issues. 
As I have argued elsewhere, many cases decided by the 
Supreme Court involve indeterminate constitutional or 
statutory language, a lack of clear precedent, and competing 
values and interests.4 How the justices resolve those cases 
inevitably involves weighing values and making judgments.5 
One can call those types of determinations ideological, 
subjective,6 or something else; one can disagree—
vehemently—with the decisions and reasoning of particular 
justices and particular cases; and one can even argue that 
some justices appear to be more aggressive than others (even 
inappropriately aggressive) in their decisions, in making 
broad statements with strong ideological implications, or in 
declining to defer to the other branches of government or to 
precedent. But we cannot look seriously at the work of the 
Court and claim that the hardest cases the justices confront 
have legally neutral answers that can be objectively 
determined. And if we are honest about that reality, then we 
have to admit that, to some degree, it is the justices’ job to 
make decisions that inherently have some ideological 
content.7 What we should be arguing about, then, is the 
nature of those ideological judgments and the extent to which 
they are and should be manifest in both case outcomes and 
the content of opinions.8 
  
 4. See Carolyn Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality and Confessing Subjectivity in 
Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 455, 457-58, 471-72 
(2013); Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical 
Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 81, 126-28 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro, 
Context of Ideology]. In Context of Ideology, for example, I used Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), as an example, 
explaining that the key texts—the Fourteenth Amendment and Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)—were indeterminate, requiring the justices to 
make “political judgments, informed by their value-laden understanding of the 
meaning of Brown.” Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra, at 127. 
 5. See Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 127. 
 6. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 258, 289 (2008). 
 7. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 126. 
 8. Id. at 122.  
2015] NUMBERS, MOTIVATED REASONING 387 
Put in the context of the First Amendment cases 
examined in In-Group Bias,9 this concern suggests to me that 
the authors have framed their question in the wrong way. 
The issue may be not so much whether the justices are biased 
towards members of their favored groups, but to what extent 
the balance of competing values and interests leads to 
different results for First Amendment claims in different 
contexts.10 Pettys suggests as much in his discussion of 
Justice Alito’s votes in the campaign finance cases.11 Noting 
that in one case, Justice Alito voted in favor of the First 
Amendment rights of a Democratic claimant, Pettys says, 
“Justice Alito himself would surely say he has a nonpartisan 
view of political speech and the First Amendment, and this 
view renders campaign-finance restrictions especially 
vulnerable to constitutional attacks, no matter whom those 
restrictions benefit or burden in a given case.”12 In other 
words, under this view, Justice Alito is balancing various 
considerations and values in the campaign finance context. 
Agree or disagree with the balance he strikes, or accuse him 
of striking a balance that in general favors his political 
compatriots, but I do not believe that what he is doing can be 
fairly characterized as in-group bias as the authors have 
described it. 
This perspective does not mean that one must simply 
accept any Supreme Court decision as correct or justifiable.13 
One can certainly argue that competing values play an 
inappropriate role in some cases or for some justices. For 
example, many have argued that for some justices, their 
antipathy to reproductive rights inappropriately leads them 
to vote in favor of the First Amendment rights of abortion 
protesters.14 But it is one thing to say that these justices are 
  
 9. See Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
 10. See Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 82-85, 110. 
 11. Pettys, supra note 3, at 66-67. 
 12. Id. at 66. 
 13. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 128. 
 14. For critiques of McCullom v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), see, e.g., 
Trevor Bumis, Injordinances: Labor Protests, Abortion-clinic Picketing, and 
McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 167, 169 (discussing whether the 
political ideology of certain justices causes them to view abortion protesters as 
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allowing their views on one highly contested issue to affect 
their analysis of the protesters’ First Amendment rights15 
and to argue about whether that is appropriate or not, and it 
is another altogether to say that it is unconscious empathy 
for the protesters themselves that leads the justices to 
abandon their otherwise consistent (though ideological) 
views of the First Amendment.16 
Similarly, the authors explain that pro-First Amendment 
positions have long been seen as liberal positions.17 And 
although they acknowledge that increasingly, liberals are 
more likely to vote in favor of regulation than they used to 
be, and vice versa for conservatives, the authors appear to 
believe that the ideological salience and valence of the First 
Amendment itself is static across time and context.18 But this 
is not so.19 To explain this idea, we can return to campaign 
finance. Campaign finance, with all of the competing values 
it presents, is unquestionably a hot-button political issue, 
and in general, conservative justices have voted to strike 
down regulations while the liberals have more often been in 
  
more or less sympathetic); Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint 
Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 
131, 133-35 140-51 (2008) (remarking on the general susceptibility of abortion 
free speech cases to be influenced by the personal politics of individual justices); 
Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech about Favored Rights: 
Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the need for an Objective Speech 
Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 179, 220-22 (2001) (noting the presence and 
influence of political preferences in the Supreme Court decision Hill v. Colorado). 
 15. In fact, Justice Scalia has been explicit that he is doing exactly this. In Hill 
v. Colorado, he explained that, because there was no the possibility of outlawing 
abortion through the political process, abortion opponents had an even more 
urgent need to get their message across to individual women. 530 U.S. 703, 741-
42 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 16. Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 1, at 6. 
 17. Id. at 5. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 94-97 (discussing Anna 
Harvey and Michael Woodruff’s work). 
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dissent.20 This is so regardless of who the plaintiff is.21 In this 
context, then, the valence of the First Amendment issue itself 
is the opposite of what the authors would predict. But this is 
not because of the identity of the parties per se, but rather 
because of the justices’ views about the regulation of money 
in politics.22 Being in favor of regulation in this context is 
simply not a conservative position in American politics today.  
If there is some kind of bias at work in the campaign 
finance cases,23 it may be that the justices vote for outcomes 
that they believe are more favorable to the advancement of 
their overall ideological views. And we cannot assume that if 
such bias exists in the campaign finance context, similar 
biases would be present in other types of First Amendment 
cases that, for example, do not directly implicate partisan 
politics.24 But evaluating these possibilities requires a much 
more fine-grained analysis than simply looking at which 
justices vote which way.25 Likewise, in the campaign finance 
context, we can, for example, criticize the conservative 
justices for defining corruption so narrowly that many of the 
justifications for campaign finance regulation become 
irrelevant.26 But as with the abortion protester cases, the 
problem, if there is one, is not necessarily that the justices 
have abandoned their First Amendment principles. It is that 
we might disagree substantively with what those principles 
are and how they interact with the justices’ views on other 
important issues. That’s a conversation worth having. 
  
 20. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. 
Ct. 2806 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); 
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 21. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (plaintiff is conservative PAC); Davis, 
554 U.S. 724 (plaintiff is democrat politician); Pettys, supra note 3, at 61-68 
(citing Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (plaintiff is conservative PAC). 
 22. See Pettys, supra note 3, at 66-70. 
 23. See Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 24. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 134. 
 25. See Pettys, supra note 3. 
 26. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908-09 (holding that only quid pro quo 
corruption can be legitimately targeted by campaign regulation). 
